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Abstract
We analyze primary and general election campaigning. Positive campaigning builds
a candidate’s reputation; negative campaigning damages a rival’s. Each primary can-
didate hopes to win the general election; but failing that, he wants his primary rival
to win. We establish that general elections always feature more negative campaign-
ing than positive, as long as reputations are easier to tear down than build up. In
contrast, if the effects of primary campaigns strongly persist, primary elections always
feature more positive campaigning than negative. This reflects that a primary winner
benefits only from his positive primary campaigning in general elections, and negative
campaigning by a rival hurts.
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1 Introduction
The media has long highlighted how negative campaigning dominates political debate. In-
deed, in 2012, 85% of President Obama’s advertising was negative, while 91% of Romney ads
were negative, and in 2016, over 90% of the ads for both Clinton and Trump were negative.1
What has received less attention is the fact that primary campaigns are far less negative
than general election campaigns. For example, in the 2004 Democratic presidential primary,
most ads were positive (CMAG); and, in the 2012 Republican primary, while Romney, the
strong favorite, ran far more negative ads than positive ads, Gingrich, Paul and Santorum
collectively did the opposite.2 Our paper provides an explanation for why primary campaigns
are more positive than general election campaigns.
In our model, two challengers compete in a primary, with the winner advancing to face
an incumbent from the opposing party in a general election. Each challenger hopes to win
the general election; but failing that, he wants his primary rival to defeat the incumbent.
Candidates are described by their initial reputational stocks and resource budgets. A can-
didate can devote his resources to building his own reputation via positive campaigning and
to damaging an opponent’s reputation via negative campaigning. Consistent with empirical
evidence,3 we assume that reputations are easier to damage than to build. Electoral out-
comes are determined by a contest in which the probability a candidate wins depends on his
post-campaigning reputational stock and that of his opponent.
Our first result establishes that the composition of campaigning in general elections re-
flects their relative effectiveness in influencing who wins the election. It follows directly that
general elections feature more negative campaigning than positive; and, indeed, candidates
with sufficiently limited resources only campaign negatively. We then establish that primaries
campaigns are very different. Most starkly, we prove that if the effects of primary campaign-
ing persist and primary candidates are equally strong, primaries feature more positive cam-
paigning than negative—the opposite of general elections. This result reflects that a winner’s
1 Kantar Media’s Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG).
2 http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/study-negative-campaign-ads-much-more-frequent-vicious-
than-in-primaries-past/2012/02/14/gIQAR7ifPR story.html
3 Baumeister et al. (2001) summarize extensive evidence that voters weigh negative information about can-
didates more than positive information; Soroka and McAdams (2015) also document a ‘negativity bias’.
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positive primary campaigning also enhances his general election reputation. In contrast, neg-
ative primary campaigning only helps a candidate win the primary; and a losing candidate’s
negative campaigning harms his primary rival in the general election. Thus, our model recon-
ciles the opposing natures of political campaigning found in primaries and general elections.
We next relate our model to the literature on positive and negative campaigning. After
deriving the result that primaries are more positive in nature than general elections, an ex-
tended discussion develops the consequences of asymmetries between primary challengers. In
particular, consistent with Presidential primaries, when one challenger is far stronger than
the other, the strong challenger campaigns more negatively, while the weaker challenger
campaigns more positively, to avoid harming his strong rival’s general election chances.
Literature. Research on positive and negative campaigns dates back to Skaperdas and
Groffman (1995) and Harrington and Hess (1996). Skaperdas and Groffman (1995) predict
that in two candidate elections, the front-runner engages in more positive and less negative
campaigning than his opponent. Harrington and Hess (1996) build a spatial model in which
agents can alter initial ideological positions via costly relocation, and an agent’s relocation
is affected by a rival’s actions as well. They predict that a candidate with less attractive at-
tributes is more negative. Chakrabarti (2007) introduces a valence dimension to this model,
allowing candidates to influence ideological and valance factors via advertising. He shows
that candidates campaign more negatively on the dimension in which they have an advantage.
Polborn and Yi (2006) model negative and positive campaigning when a candidate can
reveal a good feature about himself, or a bad feature about a rival, and voters update about
information that is not revealed. Brueckner and Lee (2015) explore negative campaigning in
a probabilistic voting model, where voting outcomes reflect a random valence shock, showing
that a relatively centrist candidate campaigns more negatively than an extreme candidate.
Peterson and Djupe (2005) empirically study the timing and electoral contexts in which
primary races are likely to become negative. Using a content analysis of newspaper coverage
of contested Senate primaries, they uncover how negativity varies with the status of a Senate
seat (e.g., open seat vs. incumbent in primary), and the number and quality of challengers in
the primary (based on whether challengers had held office). Da Silveira and De Mello (2011)
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exploit a natural experiment in Brazil to document the large effects of campaigning expen-
ditures on electoral outcomes. Spenkuch and Toniatti (2018) use a regression discontinuity
design to document the effects of political advertising on electoral outcomes.
Our paper relates to political contests in which agents exert positive and negative ef-
forts. Konrad (2000) explores rent-seeking efforts that improve own performance and sab-
otage efforts that hurt a rival in lobbying contests. Sabotage against one group creates a
positive externality for other groups, so more lobbying groups make sabotage less attrac-
tive. Gandhi et al. (2016) provide supporting evidence of this. Soubeyran (2009) models
two-agent contests with two types of effort—attack and defense. He analyzes how attack
(negative campaigning) affects voter turnout.
Analyses of primaries and general elections include Meirowitz (2005). In his model,
candidates are uncertain about voter preferences, causing them to adopt ambiguous pri-
mary platforms to preserve flexibility, and primaries let voters signal preferences, influencing
subsequent platform choices. In Serra (2011), primaries help parties select higher valence
candidates at the expense of also selecting candidates whose policies more closely reflect
views of primary voters than general election voters (see also Adams and Merrill (2008)).
Kartik and McAfee (2007) build a model of primaries and general elections with three pos-
sible policies, where high valence candidates are (unobservedly and exogenously) committed
to some policy choice—voters value consistency. Hummel (2010) explores outcomes when
candidates find it costly to adjust policies between primaries and general elections and face
more extreme audiences in primaries.
2 Model
There are three candidates, i, j and I. Candidates i and j belong to the same party, while
incumbent I belongs to the opposing party. Challengers i and j first compete in a pri-
mary election, with the winner advancing to face I in a general election. Candidates only
care about who wins the general election—challenger k ∈ {i, j} receives U from winning,
V if his primary opponent wins, and a normalized payoff of 0 if the incumbent wins, where
U > V > 0. The incumbent receives a positive payoff if re-elected, and nothing if he loses.
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Electoral outcomes are determined by a contest, where the probability a candidate wins
rises with his reputation, and declines with his opponent’s reputation. Specifically, if Z¯i0
and Z¯j0 are the candidates’ respective reputational stocks just prior to the primary election,
then candidate i wins with probability Z¯i0
Z¯i0+Z¯j0
, and candidate j wins with residual probabil-
ity. An analogous contest determines the winner of the general election. The reduced-form
contest formulation lets us isolate the key strategic considerations of primary and general
election dynamics in a tractable way.4 Papers modeling political competition as a contest
include Esteban and Ray (1999), Klumpp and Polborn (2006), Epstein and Nitzan (2006),
Soubeyran (2009), Herrera et al. (2014), and Bouton et al. (2018); Konrad and Kovenock
(2009) explore other multi-contest settings.
Candidate k ∈ {i, j, I} starts out with reputational stock X¯k, and resources B¯k. A candi-
date can devote resources both to improving his own reputation via positive campaigning and
to damaging his opponent’s reputation via negative campaigning. If challenger k ∈ {i, j} in-
vests pk0 in positive primary campaigning to boost his own reputation, and his rival k˜ spends
nk˜0 on negatively campaigning to reduce k’s reputation, then candidate k’s reputational stock
in the primary becomes Z¯k0 = X¯k (1+pk0)
α
(1+ρnk˜0)α
. Here α > 0 measures the sensitivity of reputa-
tions to campaigning and ρ > 1 measures the greater effectiveness of negative campaigning
than positive campaigning on shaping candidate reputations (Baumeister et al. 1997, Soroka
and McAdams 2015). We show this structure reconciles simultaneously the preponderance
of negative campaigning in general elections, and positive campaigning in primaries.
If candidate k wins the primary, he enters the general election with a reputational stock
of Z¯k1 = X¯k (1+βpk0)
α
(1+βρnk˜0)α
. Here β ∈ [0, 1] allows for decay in the effects of primary campaigns
on general-election reputations, for example because voters forget primary campaigns, or
because the moderate voters who determine a general election winner pay less attention to
primary campaigns than party partisans. In a general election, challenger k’s final reputa-
tional stock is Z¯k2 = Z¯k1 (1+pk1)
α
(1+ρnI1)α , and the incumbent’s is Z¯I2 = X¯I
(1+pI1)α
(1+ρnk1)α , where pk1 and
nk1 are challenger k’s positive and negative campaigning expenditures in the general election.
Challenger k’s total electoral resource constraint is ∑t(pkt+nkt) ≤ B¯k, where pkt, nkt ≥ 0.
4 Tractability vanishes, for example, in a disclosure game signaling setting (e.g., Polborn and Yi (2006)),
where a multitude of equilibria would arise even in settings that are insufficiently rich for our purposes.
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Thus, if challenger k wins the primary after spending pk0 +nk0, he has B¯k−(pk0 +nk0) ≡ Bk1
left for the general election.5 The incumbent’s resource constraint is pI1 + nI1 ≤ B¯I .
Without loss of generality, we write challenger k ∈ {i, j}’s ex-ante expected payoff as
pik = (MPrk1 − Prk˜1)Prk0 + Prk˜1.
M = U/V is the relative payoff from winning the general election versus having a primary
rival win, and Prkt is the probability that k wins the primary (t = 0) or general (t = 1)
election.6
We first characterize equilibrium campaigning in a general election.
Proposition 1. In a general election, if candidate k ∈ {i, j, I}’s resources Bk1 exceed ρ−1ρ ,
then k campaigns both positively and negatively, spending more on negative campaigning:
n∗k1 =
Bk1
2 +
ρ− 1
2ρ and p
∗
k1 =
Bk1
2 −
ρ− 1
2ρ .
If, instead, Bk1 ≤ ρ−1ρ , then candidate k only campaigns negatively, n∗k1 = Bk1 and p∗k1 = 0.
The proof follows directly. In the general election, challenger k wins with probability
Prk1 =
Z¯k2
Z¯k2 + Z¯I2
=
Z¯k1
(1+pk1)α
(1+ρnI1)α
Z¯k1
(1+pk1)α
(1+ρnI1)α + X¯I
(1+pI1)α
(1+ρnk1)α
,
which, written as a function of what k controls in the general election, takes the form
Prk1 =
a(1 + pk1)α
a(1 + pk1)α + b/(1 + ρnk1)α
,
where a and b are positive constants obtained by dividing numerator and denominator by
X¯I
(1+pI1)α
(1+ρni1)α . Multiplying numerator and denominator by (1+ρnk1)
α/b, and simplifying yields
Prk1 =
a[(1 + pk1)α(1 + ρnk1)α]/b
a[(1 + pk1)α(1 + ρnk1)α]/b+ 1
,
5 This formulation is equivalent to one in which challengers have separate primary and general election
budgets, as long as they do not face binding primary budget constraints, and can conserve unspent
primary budgets for the general election.
6 Our analysis presumes that M is large enough that even if one challenger is far stronger, his weak rival
cares enough about personally winning that he wants to enter the primary, even though it helps the
incumbent.
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implying that k maximizes the quasi-concave objective (1 + pk1)α(1 + ρnk1)α ≡ [Pk1Nk1]α.
Only relative effectiveness matters for general elections: When ρ > 1, it is easier to tear
down a reputation than build one up, so candidates spend more on negative campaigns than
positive ones, and if their resources are too limited, they only campaign negatively. Thus,
very underfunded challengers only campaign “against” an incumbent in a general election,
and candidates with more resources devote (weakly) greater shares to positive campaigning.
We now establish that, consistent with the data, candidates campaign relatively more
positively in the primary than in the general election.
Proposition 2. Provided that challenger k devotes any resources to positive campaign-
ing he campaigns relatively more positively in the primary than in the general election:
n∗k0 − p∗k0 ≤ n∗k1 − p∗k1 = ρ−1ρ , where the inequality is strict unless β = 0.
The proof in the appendix proceeds by evaluating the relative strengths of the direct and
indirect effects of an increase in β on primary campaigning. Challengers campaign relatively
more positively in primaries than in general elections for two reasons: (1) the primary win-
ner only benefits from positive primary campaigning in the general election; and (2) when a
party rival wins the primary, the adverse effects of a negative campaign against him persist.
We now assume:
Assumption A1 (sufficient resources): Candidates have enough resources that they
campaign both positively and negatively (i.e., first-order conditions describe the equilibrium).
Assumption A2 (symmetry): Challengers i and j have identical initial reputations,
X¯i = X¯j ≡ X¯C and resources, B¯i = B¯j ≡ B¯C .
In a working paper, we establish that under these conditions there exists a βˆ ∈ (0, 1] such
that for all β < βˆ increases in β cause challengers to reduce negative primary campaigning
and increase positive primary campaigning. In the appendix, we prove that an especially
striking result obtains when enough of the effects of primary campaigning persist:
Proposition 3. Under (A1) and (A2), for any relative effectiveness of negative campaign-
ing ρ, if the effects of primary campaigning are long-lived (β sufficiently close to one), then
p∗k0 > n
∗
k0, i.e., challengers campaign more positively than negatively in primaries.
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Thus, when the effects of primary campaigning are long-lived, challengers campaign more
positively than negatively in primaries, while the opposite occurs in general elections.
3 Extended Discussion and Conclusion
Negative campaigning dominates US general elections. What has received less attention is
that primary campaigns are more positive in nature. Our dynamic theory of campaigning rec-
onciles these conflicting observations. If it is easier to damage an opponent’s reputation than
to build one’s own (Baumeister et al. (2001), Soroka and McAdams (2015)), then general elec-
tion campaigns are more negative than positive because candidates only care about winning.
The composition of primary campaigns reflects that primary winners only gain in the general
election from positive primary campaigning; and primary losers harm a rival’s general election
chances with negative campaigns. We show that if the effects of political campaigns persist,
then similarly-qualified challengers campaign more positively than negatively in primaries.
This raises the question as to what happens when challenger differ. In a working paper, we
derive how the relative strengths of challengers and the incumbent affect the composition of
political campaigning when challengers have similar reputations and resources, and primary
campaigning only has small effects on general election reputations (β is small). We prove that
(i) challengers reduce both positive and negative primary campaigning in response to facing
a stronger incumbent with more resources; and (ii) both challengers increase both positive
and negative primary campaigning when one challenger gains slightly more resources, Bi.
Intuitively, facing a relatively stronger incumbent, and consistent with Peterson and
Djupe (2005), similarly-situated challengers want to conserve resources for the tougher gen-
eral election by reducing positive and negative primary campaigning. Strategic complemen-
tarities reinforce this: if one challenger spends less on primary campaigning, so does the
other. This reflects that if challenger i saves more funds for the general election, i is more
likely to defeat the incumbent, so challenger j minds losing the primary by less.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how the relative strengths of challengers affect campaigning
when they face a strong or a weak incumbent and the effects of campaigning persist. These
numerical findings illustrate how with a strong incumbent, if one challenger is far stronger
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than the other, then making the strong challenger even stronger causes a weak rival to reduce
primary campaigning, in particular reducing his negative campaigning by more than he in-
creases his positive campaigning. A weak challenger internalizes that his rival has far better
chances in the general election that he does not want to harm, and that greater primary cam-
paigning reduces his own low general election chances. In turn, the strong challenger reduces
his primary campaigning, as his rival’s less aggressive campaign reinforces his advantage.
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Figure 1: Primary campaigning as a function of challenger i’s resources with a strong incumbent when
campaigning persists. Parameters: X¯j = X¯i = 6, B¯I = 15, X¯I = 10, B¯j = 10, α = 1, ρ = 2, β = 1.
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Figure 2: Primary campaigning as a function of challenger i’s resources with a weak incumbent when
campaigning persists. Parameters: X¯j = X¯i = 6, B¯I = 5, X¯I = 10, B¯j = 10, α = 1, ρ = 2, β = 1.
Thus, contrary to general election campaigns, in primaries, a strong challenger cam-
paigns more negatively than a weak one; and a very weak challenger’s campaign may be
totally positive, consistent with Peterson and Djupe’s finding that in primaries incumbents
face less negative campaigning from weak opponents. Republican presidential primaries illus-
trate this: in 2012, Romney had far more resources than rivals, and was far more negative;
and in 2000, the weak candidate, John McCain, decided against “battling negative with
negative...[in response to] the sheer volume of [Bush’s] negative assaults.”7
7 www.nytimes.com/2000/02/16/us/the-2000-campaign-the-arizona-senator-mccain-catches-mud-then-
parades-it.html
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5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Candidate i wins the primary with probability Pri0 = Z¯i0Z¯i0+Z¯j0 ,
choosing pi0 and ni0 to maximize
pii = (MPri1 − Prj1)Pri0 + Prj1.
Define Pit = 1 + pit and Nit = 1 + ρnit for t ∈ {0, 1}, and let Q∗i0 =
X¯j(P ∗j0N∗j0)α
X¯i(P ∗i0N∗i0)α
, Q∗i1 =
X¯I(P ∗I N
∗
I (1−β+βN∗j0))α
X¯i(P ∗i1N∗i1(1−β+βP ∗i0))α
, with analogous expressions for j. Thus, Prit = 11+Q∗it . If i has enough re-
sources that pi1 > 0, then at an interior optimum, (N∗i0, P ∗i0) satisfy the first-order conditions:
∂pii
∂Ni0
= (MPri1 − Prj1)∂Pri0
∂Ni0
+ Pri0
(
M
∂Pri1
∂Ni0
− ∂Prj1
∂Ni0
)
+ ∂Prj1
∂Ni0
=
(
M
1 +Q∗i1
− 11 +Q∗j1
)
αQ∗i0
N∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)2
− 11 +Q∗i0
(
αMQ∗i1
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
− αβQ
∗
j1
(1− β + βN∗i0)(1 +Q∗j1)2
)
− αβQ
∗
j1
(1− β + βN∗i0)(1 +Q∗j1)2
= 0,
∂pii
∂Pi0
= (MPri1 − Prj1)∂Pri0
∂Pi0
+MPri0
∂Pri1
∂Pi0
=
(
M
1 +Q∗i1
− 11 +Q∗j1
)
αQ∗i0
P ∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)2
− αMQ
∗
i1
(1 +Q∗i0)(1 +Q∗i1)2
( 1
P ∗i1
− β1− β + βP ∗i0
)
= 0,
where, for example, ∂Pri0
∂Ni0
= ∂Pri0
∂Qi0
∂Qi0
∂Ni0
= −1(1+Qi0)2
−αQi0
Ni0
= αQi0(1+Qi0)2 , and N
∗
i1 = ρP ∗i1 =
(1 + ρ+ ρB¯i2 −
ρP ∗i0+N∗i0
2 ). Combine the last two terms in
∂pii
∂Ni0
, divide by α1+Q∗i0 and rearrange:(
M
1 +Q∗i1
− 11 +Q∗j1
)
Q∗i0
N∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)
= MQ
∗
i1
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
+
βQ∗j1Q
∗
i0
(1− β + βN∗i0)(1 +Q∗j1)2
(1)
Similarly, re-arrange ∂pii
∂Pi0
= 0 to obtain:
(
M
1 +Q∗i1
− 11 +Q∗j1
)
Q∗i0
P ∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)
= MQ
∗
i1
(1 +Q∗i1)2
( 1
P ∗i1
− β1− β + βP ∗i0
)
. (2)
Dividing equation (2) by (1) yields a LHS of N
∗
i0
P ∗i0
, and then multiplying both sides by the
denominator of the RHS yields
N∗i0
P ∗i0
(
MQ∗i1
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
+
βQ∗j1Q
∗
i0
(1− β + βN∗i0)(1 +Q∗j1)2
)
= MQ
∗
i1
P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
− βMQ
∗
i1
(1− β + βP ∗i0)(1 +Q∗i1)2
.
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Multiplying both sides by P ∗i0 yields
MQ∗i1
(1 +Q∗i1)2
(
N∗i0
N∗i1
− P
∗
i0
P ∗i1
+ βP
∗
i0
1− β + βP ∗i0
)
+
βN∗i0Q
∗
j1Q
∗
i0
(1− β + βN∗i0)(1 +Q∗j1)2
= 0. (3)
At an interior optimum, n∗i0, p∗i0 > 0, or equivalently N∗i0, P ∗i0 > 1. The second term of
equation (3) is positive, so the first grouped term must be negative. Thus,
N∗i0
N∗i1
− P
∗
i0
P ∗i1
< 0⇐⇒ P
∗
i0
N∗i0
>
P ∗i1
N∗i1
= 1
ρ
,
or equivalently,
n∗i0 − p∗i0 < n∗i1 − p∗i1 =
ρ− 1
ρ
.
When β = 0, equations (1) and (2) reduce to
(
M
1 +Q∗i1
− 11 +Q∗j1
)
Q∗i0
N∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)
− MQ
∗
i1
N∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
= 0 (4)
and (
M
1 +Q∗i1
− 11 +Q∗j1
)
Q∗i0
P ∗i0(1 +Q∗i0)
− MQ
∗
i1
P ∗i1(1 +Q∗i1)2
= 0. (5)
Then, as before, it follows that
P ∗i0
P ∗i1
− N
∗
i0
N∗i1
= 0⇐⇒ P
∗
i0
N∗i0
= P
∗
i1
N∗i1
= 1
ρ
⇐⇒ n∗i0 − p∗i0 = n∗i1 − p∗i1 =
ρ− 1
ρ
. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let (A1) and (A2) hold. With symmetry, Q∗i0 = 1, Q∗i1 = Q∗j1.
Substituting these expressions and β = 1 into equation (3) yields:
MQ∗i1
(1 +Q∗i1)2
(
N∗i0
N∗i1
− P
∗
i0
P ∗i1
+ 1
)
+ Q
∗
i1
(1 +Q∗i1)2
= 0.
Dividing by Q
∗
i1
(1+Q∗i1)2
yields
M
(
N∗i0
N∗i1
− P
∗
i0
P ∗i1
+ 1
)
+ 1 = 0.
Re-arranging this equality yields
N∗i0
N∗i1
− P
∗
i0
P ∗i1
= −M + 1
M
= −1− 1
M
< −1. (6)
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Substituting N∗i1 = ρP ∗i1, the inequality in (6) simplifies to:
N∗i0/ρ− P ∗i0 < −P ∗i1. (7)
Further, since P ∗i0 = 1+p∗i0 andN∗i0 = 1+ρn∗i0, andBi1 = B¯i−(p∗i0+n∗i0) = B¯i−(P ∗i0−1)−N
∗
i0−1
ρ
,
P ∗i1 =
ρ+ 1
2ρ +
Bi1
2 =
1
ρ
(
1 + ρ+ ρB¯i2 −
ρPi0 +Ni0
2
)
.
Rewrite inequality (7) as
(
N∗i0
ρ
− P ∗i0
)
< −1
ρ
(
1 + ρ+ ρB¯i2 −
ρPi0 +Ni0
2
)
.
Multiplying both sides by ρ and rearranging the right-hand side yields:
N∗i0 − ρP ∗i0 < 1− ρ−
(
2 + ρB¯i2 −
ρPi0 +Ni0
2
)
. (8)
From Proposition 1, challengers campaign negatively and positively in the general election if
B¯i − (P ∗i0 − 1)−
(
N∗i0 − 1
ρ
)
>
ρ− 1
ρ
. (9)
Multiplying both sides by ρ and rearranging, we rewrite (9) as
1 + ρB¯i2 −
ρPi0 +Ni0
2 > 0. (10)
Hence, from (8) and (10),
N∗i0 − ρP ∗i0 < 1− ρ−
(
2 + ρB¯i2 −
ρPi0 +Ni0
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0 from (10)
< 1− ρ, i.e., N∗i0 − ρP ∗i0 < 1− ρ.
Substituting N∗i0 = 1 + ρn∗i0 and P ∗i0 = 1 + p∗i0 to this inequality yields
1 + ρn∗i0 − (ρ(1 + p∗i0)) < 1− ρ⇔ ρ(n∗i0 − p∗i0) < 0.
Continuity of n∗i0, p∗i0 in β implies that the result extends for all β sufficiently large. 
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